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Abstract: This paper applies a multitasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of 
regulatory authority for health and environmental risks.  The model characterizes conditions 
under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to 
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This paper analyzes the impact of regulatory structure on policy outcomes in the 
regulation of health and environmental risk. Structure arises from the delegation of regulatory 
authority by the legislature, which enables the development of the expertise needed to resolve 
technical regulatory matters (Wilson, Rosenbloom). Along with the specific expertise, the 
delegation creates informational asymmetries between and among the legislature, the 
bureaucracy, and the regulated firms. These informational issues exacerbate the tension between 
the political control of the bureaucracy and the independent application of its expertise raising 
questions about oversight and the potential capture of the bureaucracy (Sunstein).  Since different 
choices about delegation create different informational environments and different incentives for 
the actors, this paper explores how the choice about how to delegate regulatory authority impacts 
on the formulation and implementation of policy, and ultimately on social welfare. 
The development of agricultural biotechnology provides an interesting and important 
example of the relevance of the study of the structure bureaucracy.  In addition to the 
uncertainties inherent in a new and evolving technology, regulatory issues are complicated by the 
fact that the responsibility for regulating the risks of the products has been distributed among 
several agencies. While early legislative proposals considered consolidating authority in a single 
agency Congress ultimately passed no new legislation, leaving existing agencies with the task of 
regulating based on a variety of statutes that predate the technology (Krimsky1982, 1991).  As a 
result, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) became the agencies primarily responsible for 
environmental, health, and field testing risks, respectively. This distribution of responsibility need 
not imply ineffective regulation, and aspects of this approach have been defended in an 
independent review (NRC). The goal of this paper is to clarify the conditions under which these 
multiple delegations are likely to be socially beneficial.    3
This study derives hypotheses about regulatory structure using models of hierarchy that 
build on models first applied to the firm. Tirole outlines some of the differences that arise when 
modeling government instead of private firms. Two that are relevant to this study are that, first, a 
government is likely to have multiple goals, some of which may be difficult to measure and, 
second, as has already been stressed, governmental objectives are often pursued through multiple 
principals. As a result of the first difference, informational problems in government are likely to 
be more severe than in the private sector, and incentives are weaker with payments less closely 
tied to outcomes (see also Dixit 1996).  This weakening of incentives within the bureaucracy 
leaves scope for a choice of mission; the weight given to any particular goal may be susceptible 
to the intrinsic interests of the bureaucrats or capture by special interests.   
With regard to multiple principals, Tirole notes that no one is delegated the responsibility 
for maximizing social welfare. Instead, each agency receives specific responsibilities, such as 
promoting the interests of industry, or of public health, worker safety, environmental protection 
and so on. An element of competition may exist among the agencies, which yields incentives for 
a more complete discovery of relevant information. Delegation then can potentially counter the 
incentive problems created by the multiple goals of government.  Alternatively competition may 
be destructive, with the agencies differing objectives creating frictions.  
The multiple goals and the multiple principal nature of government have been studied in 
environments with adverse selection (Martimort 1995, Martimort 1999), and moral hazard (Dixit 
1996, 1997). In all of these models the aggregate incentives for the regulated firm, are weakened 
relative to the benchmark single principal program. This result arises from the strategic 
interaction of the multiple principals, who may free-ride on the others incentives, as in Martimort 
(1995), or compete wastefully for the agent’s effort as in Dixit.  Martimort (1999) explains the 
prevalence of multiple principal regulation through dynamic effects that counter the low-powered 
incentives in the adverse selection framework. This paper, similarly, extends the basic findings of   4
Dixit’s moral hazard model by introducing countervailing effects that have been relevant to risk 
regulation. 
The model presented below is an adaptation of Dixit’s study of moral hazard in politics 
(Dixit 1996, 1997).  His approach incorporates both the common agency model of Bernheim and 
Whinston and agent multi-tasking developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom.   In the application to 
regulation, a firm is the agent of either single or multiple principals who represent the regulatory 
agencies
1. Dixit argues that common agency of this type is “perhaps the quintessential feature of a 
process of political management of an economic activity” (Dixit 1996 p.157).   While this model 
is preliminary in some respects, particularly because it offers a reduced form of the bureaucrat’s 
objectives, it derives clear predictions about the incentives that result from the legislative super-
principal’s choice of delegation to single or multiple principals.  In addition, this adaptation 
explores the tradeoffs between agency competition, and expertise that arise when multiple 
principals are chosen. The model also examines how constraints on regulators by a “super-
principal” can ameliorate the problems of multiple principal regulation.  This extension 
formalizes the notions of regulatory coordination that have been instituted in the regulation of 
biotechnology (OSTP), and have been suggested in efforts to reform risk regulation more broadly 
(Breyer). 
 
2  A Model of Regulatory Structure 
In what follows, Dixit’s general model of n principals and m tasks is adapted and 
presented as a two by two model in order to explore relevant aspects of the regulatory structure 
for genetically modified organisms. Specifically, I focus on the behavior of two government 
agencies, representing the EPA and the FDA, that have the authority to approve the marketing of 
                                                           
1 The legislature’s choice is not modeled explicitly, the relation between the regulators and the firm are 
modeled order to focus on the consequences of the different types of delegation.  Throughout the paper 
“principals” will refer to the regulatory agencies, and “agent” to the firm. The legislature and executive 
branches will be conceived of as a “superprincipals” when necessary.    5
a new genetically modified food.  The agencies, as principals, induce their common agent, the 
firm, to evaluate the potential health and environmental risks of the product. The risk assessment 
procedure is inexact and so the effort devoted to determining the characteristics of the product is 
linked imperfectly to the ultimate realization of hazards, creating a moral hazard.   
The model below represents the inducements to the agent, as well as the benefits accruing 
to the principals, in terms of transfers and utilities as is common in the principal agent literature. 
Dixit notes that this representation, in the context of interactions between firms and the 
government, stands in for a more complicated bargaining game. While the actual objective 
functions particularly of the regulatory bodies, can be quite complex (see Wilson), this model 
abstracts from these issues in order to sharpen the focus on how the choice of structure affects the 
incentives faced by the regulated firms.  
 
2.1 The  Model 
A firm interested in marketing a new product is required to determine the potential health 
and environmental impacts of its introduction by performing risk assessment activities.  The 
assessment efforts are represented by a vector, t, where  [] 2 1 t t t = ′  and the subscripts stand in 
for evaluations of the environmental risk and human health risk, respectively. Efforts are 
increasing in t, which is imperfectly observable to those outside the firm. Effort is linked to an 
observable outcome x through the technology,  ε + = t x with  [] 2 1 x x x = ′  and  [] 2 1 ε ε ε = ′  a 
random shock. ε  is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance-covariance 
matrix Ω.  The uncertainty captured by the variance-covariance matrix is a measure of the 
expertise of the regulatory agency, which in this general formulation includes the difficulty of 
discerning the reliability of the risk assessment task. For purposes of exposition Ω is assumed to 
be the identity matrix.   6
Two principals, representing government agencies have the job of motivating the firm to 
perform the risk assessment tasks.  The principals, who are assumed to be risk neutral, have the 
objective functions  2 , 1 = − ′ i z x b i i , where  [] 2 1 i i i b b b = ′  represents the marginal valuations 
of the components of output for the i
th  principal and  i z  the principals transfer to the agent. 
2 1 z z z + = . The expected returns for the i
th principal are given by  i i i i z t b z x b E − ′ = 
 
 − ′ .   
Consistent with the ordering of tasks in the notation related to efforts, principal 1 represents the 
EPA and principal 2, the FDA. 
Multiple principle regulation naturally raises the question of coordination of the activities 
of the regulatory authorities.  In this model two types of coordination are considered. The first is 
the case in which each of the principal’s responsibilities is clearly defined and not overlapping 
with that of the other regulator.  Successful implementation of this type of coordination implies 
that the EPA’s benefit function is associated only with the environmental risk, and the FDA’s 
only with the food risks, so that  j i j i bij ≠ = = , 2 , 1 . , 0 .  An additional coordination issue 
arises due to non-cooperative behavior in the provision of incentives. This issue is introduced 
below and is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.2  
The regulated firm is risk averse and is assumed to have a utility function that is captured 





− = , C is two-by-
two matrix of the effort cost parameters and r is a measure of the agents risk aversion. The 
structure of C , which reflects the extent to which efforts are complements or substitutes, has an 
important effect on the power of incentives.  In general, the off-diagonal elements are unrestricted 









, and so the efforts compete in the firm’s objective.   Alternatively, the cross partial   7
may be decreasing.   This would be the case, for example, when the effort devoted to evaluating 
health risks reduces the marginal costs of the environmental risk assessment, since the human and 
animal health effects of the product may be quite similar. More generally, advances in 
understanding the implications of expression of the transferred genetic material, that arise with 
respect to one task, may have an effect on the cost of the other. Both of these considerations 
suggest that the case of strategic complements, where the off diagonal elements are less than or 
equal to zero is likely to be the more relevant case.  The analysis below begins by assuming C is 
diagonal and explores alternatives with reference to this benchmark. 
This note derives results for a multitasking agent under first, second, and third best 
conditions.  In the first best, there is full observability, and so contracts are formed directly on the 
agent’s effort.  The second best results when efforts are unobservable and incentives are the 
choice of a single principal. The introduction of an additional principal creates a “third best” 
environment, since the optimal incentives for the agent are affected by the non-cooperative 
behavior of the principals. 
 
Case 1: Observable effort 
When the efforts of the firm are observable,  0 = ε and  x t = . The first best solution 
results from the maximization of the expected surplus of the principals and the agent, 
2 Ct t t b ′ − ′ , with the transfer z assumed to satisfy the participation constraint. 
The first order condition yields  
b C t
1 *
− = .      (1) 
with the optimal level of effort maximizing welfare. 
 
Case 2: Unobservable Effort     8
When the effort of the firm is unobservable, the regulators condition their payments onx .  
As in Dixit, I assume an aggregate payment scheme that takes the linear form  β α + ′ = x z . Each 
regulatory agency then proposes  i i i x z β α + ′ = , where  [] 2 , 1 2 1 = = i i i i α α α ,  with the first 
subscript denoting the principal and the second the task. This transfer, metaphorical as noted 
above, represents the expectation of profits as well as liabilities for harms from the product as 
well as the expected benefits or costs in continued dealings with the regulatory authority that arise 
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exp β α .  Applying the moment generating function of the 
















exp α α β α , 
with y the certainty equivalent income of the uncertain prospect and β  a transfer that is assumed 
to satisfy the participation constraint.  The agent chooses t to maximize 
() Ct t r t ′ + Ω ′ − + ′ α α β α
2
1
which yields, at the optimum, the second best effort level 
α
1 * *
− = C t .          (2) 
A comparison of (1) and (2) makes clear that when  b = α  the first best results. By exploring the 
regulators programs we can see that, when effort is unobservable, this will not be the case. 
  With a unified regulatory authority, the joint surplus can be expressed as 
() α α α Ω + ′ −




 and the first order condition implies that  
()
* α Ω + = rC I b .  (3)     9
With  0 > Ω rC ,  b < * α and the incentive to devote effort to the assessment tasks is weakened 
relative to the first best
2. In a multiple principal framework, the choice of incentives is made 
strategically, considering not only the firm’s solution (2) but also the fact that the other regulator 
is eliciting efforts to meet its own objectives.  
In a strategic setting, each principal chooses their incentives to maximize their bilateral 
surplus with agent, taking the other principal’s choice as given.  The bilateral benefit for the 
environmental regulator and the agent is given as  












′ − − r C r C b . (4) 
Maximizing (4) with respect to  1 α  and solving for  1 b  yields  () 2 1 1 α α Ω + Ω + = rC rC I b  with 
1 α defined implicitly as a best response to  2 α . Repeating for principal two and summing the 
optimality condition over both principals yields the aggregate benefit scheme 
()
* * 2 α Ω + = rC I b .  (5)     
A comparison of  (5) and (3) illustrates the weakening of incentives that is at the heart of multiple 
principal regulation.  In the non-cooperative outcome of (5) the term that creates the wedge 
between the first and second best is magnified, thus shifting effort to a “third best” result
3. A 
more careful examination of the bilateral surplus in (4) clarifies why this weakening occurs. 
Consider the incentives for the environmental regulator, principal 1, to induce effort for 
assessment of the health risk, task 2.  If the principal neglects this dimension of the firm’s task, 
the incentives are  [] 0 11 1 α α = . But as is demonstrated below, the environmental regulator has 
a profitable deviation, that of making  0 12 < α .  The health regulator is similarly motivated in its 
                                                           
2 When the off-diagonal elements  ij c are less than zero it is necessary that  ii ij c c < for the weakening of 
incentives to hold. 
3 In general the factor that captures the weakening of incentives is Ω nrC where n  is the number of  
principals.    10
evaluation of food safety and so, in a non-cooperative setting, the equilibrium incentives reflect 
the losses due to the competition for effort by the regulators. 
 The negative incentive implies that the agent pays principal 1 for the effort put into task 
2.  The net effect of the interaction is that an equilibrium exists in which the compensation 
provided by the principal moves closer to a fixed rather than variable payment. These results 
suggest that some oversight or restrictions on the regulator’s ability to penalize the firm could be 
beneficial. Before exploring this issue I consider the impact of different cost structures on the 
magnitude of penalties.  
In the base case with C diagonal and  0 12 = b  the first order condition with respect to 
12 α , yields  ( ) 0 22 12 22 22 12 12 = + + = α α σ α rc b . Manipulation of this result yields 












Since each principal provides positive incentives for the action it is interested in, 
0 22 > α , and therefore  0 12 < α . With  0 22 22 > σ rc , the magnitude of principal 1’s disincentive 
is smaller than that of principal 2’s incentive,  12 22 α α > , so that there are positive incentives 
for the two tasks in the Nash equilibrium. Note also that the difference in the magnitude is 
shrinking with a noisier information structure as expected. As the link between actions and 
outcomes becomes less clear, it becomes less efficient to try to motivate through incentives, since 
more of the funds are inefficiently passed through to the other principal. As a result, the principals 
move towards an incentive scheme that relies more on fixed payments. 
When C is not diagonal the analysis is slightly more involved, due to the interaction of 
the incentives for the different tasks.  A more general formulation of (6) yields,  

















+ − =  (6a)   11
when  1 = r  and  I = Ω , which are assumed to clarify the exposition.   The magnitude of the 
penalty that the EPA chooses for the health assessment task depends on the sign of the off 
diagonal term. When  21 c  is less than zero, the incentive to penalize the agent is diminished. 
 
2.2  Explaining Multiple Principal Regulation 
2.2.1  The Role of Expertise 
Given that multiple principal regulation results in diminished incentives, the question 
arises as to why it exists. In the following sections we introduce two issues that have been 
important in the regulation of agricultural biotechnology that can mitigate or offset the social 
costs that arise from the multiple principal structure. The first of these is related to the existence 
and development of expertise in the bureaucracy, and the second to the possibility of regulatory 
coordination by a legislative or executive branch super-principal. 
The delegation decision has been explained by the need for expertise (Sunstein). In the 
multiple principal framework, each principal has a specific expertise related to the product or to 
an aspect of its effects, such as on human health or the environment. In the modification that 
follows expertise is modeled as the ability to make a more reliable observation of the agent’s 
behavior, so that the noise in the information structure is smaller when expertise increases. 
Multiple principal regulation can make sense when the degradation of incentives resulting from 
the non-cooperative behavior is offset by increased expertise in the individual agencies. Recalling 
the basic result from (3) and (5) we consider the question of whether incentives are greater under 
single or multiple principal regulation. 
In the base case, with C and Ω diagonal, and  2 , 1 , , , = = i M S k
k
i α representing the 











σ > , where the  s
k
ii ' σ are the appropriate 
variances in the 
k Ω matrices.  
  
2.2.2  A Coordinated Framework 
This section extends the coordination of the principals, which has until now focussed on 
the correspondence between tasks and benefits, to include coordination in the provision of 
incentives. This coordination is imposed by a super-principal, from either the legislative or 
executive branches and results in a constrained Nash equilibrium. In its most extreme form, this 
constraint prohibits the principals from instituting a penalty for effort devoted to the other 
principal’s task.  The feasible incentive schemes include incentives only for the activity of 
interest to the principal. More generally, the principal may be constrained so that its fines on the 
agent are not as large as in the non-cooperative setting. This section outlines the first case of 
perfect coordination as an example and then derives the conditions for the optimal regulatory 
structure given imperfect coordination by the super-principal. The final section combines the 
coordination results with those related to gains in expertise due to delegation in order to generate 
general conditions on the optimal structure.  
In the coordinated framework, the principals still formulate their incentives strategically. 
The constraint on the  2 , 1 = i i α , however implies that the bilateral surplus between agent and 
principal 1 in equation (4) reduces to a form that omits concern for principal 2’s task of interest. 
With  [] 0 11 1 b b = ′ ,  [] 0 11 1 α α = ′ , and  [] 22 2 0 α α = ′ , principal 1 chooses  11 α  to   
maximize  () ( ) 11 11
2
11 11 11 11 2
1
σ α α r b + Γ − Γ  where  11 Γ  and  11 σ  represent the elements from the 
first row and column of 





















b .  The coordination restores the second best since the aggregate benefit 
function does not result in the magnification of the term that weakens incentives.  The resulting 
aggregate benefit is  () α Ω + = rC I b , as in equation (3).   















b .   When the 
tasks are close complements the terms in the C matrix are approximately equal in absolute value, 
and  0 → C .  Thus, when the superprincipal effectively constrains the principals,  11 11 b → α  
approximating the first best.  More generally, when the principals are imperfectly constrained it is 
clear that there is some improvement in incentives.  





















 , where 
11 11 1 c r R σ = .   This change in incentives will always fall between negative one and zero, with 
the extremes representing the cases of infinite risk aversion and risk neutrality. Thus, with 
moderate risk aversion, as the constraint takes effect and  21 α  becomes larger (less negative), 
principal one’s incentive falls, but not as quickly, partially restoring the strength of incentives.   
  When the principals are constrained imperfectly, the incentive for the off task falls 
between zero and the unconstrained value. Focussing again on principal 2’s choice for task 1, 
0 ~
21 21 < <α α , where 
1
1 11
21 2 1 R
R b
+









− =  where   ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ θ  represents the stringency of the constraint, with  1 = θ  
unconstrained state.  The aggregate incentive under the imperfect constraint is 











α     (7) 
  
2.3  General Results on Regulatory Structure 
Combining the results related to expertise and regulatory coordination yields the 
following conditions on the choice of regulatory structure. The multiple principal structure  ) (M  
is preferred to a single principal  ) (S when gains from coordination and expertise are sufficient to 
counter the degraded incentives arising from non-cooperative behavior.    S M  when 





ii σ σ − , representing the gains from expertise.  From equations (3) and (7), the 
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3       Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Regulatory policy exists in an environment where tradeoffs between science based 
expertise and political considerations are common. The conditions derived from this analysis of 
regulatory influence on firm behavior suggest the types of problems that regulators interested in 
implementing science-based policies must address. Distributed authority may create expertise that 
is inaccessible if problems arising from non-cooperative behavior are severe. While coordination 
mechanisms have been suggested and implemented, controversy about the adequacy of regulation   15
has not been eliminated.  The difficulty of this problem suggests several points where this basic 
framework could be usefully extended. 
First it is useful to consider that the ability to constrain the behavior of the regulatory 
agencies is likely to be inversely related to the gains from expertise.  When observability of the 
firm increases due to delegation, the regulatory principals have an exploitable informational 
advantage over the super-principal.  This issue suggests that an analysis that nests the issue of 
firm incentives in a model that directly incorporates the political control of the bureaucracy would 
yield additional insights.  
An implication of this line of thought is that the additional informational problem raises 
questions about the possible effectiveness of coordination. A related line of research suggests that 
as a coordinating body attempts to address the informational gaps perverse results of either under 
or over regulation are likely to occur.  McCubbins and Schwarz propose that political bodies 
responsible for regulatory oversight often respond to “fire alarms” rather than incur the costs of 
regular monitoring through “police patrols”.  Hopenhayn and Lohmann have applied this 
reasoning and the fact that it is interest groups who often pull the alarms, to explain over and 
under regulation of risks.  These final comments which extend beyond the scope of the paper, 
suggest that the tension between political control and scientific expertise in the regulation of risk 
is deeply embedded in democratic institutions. It is hoped that the analysis presented above 
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